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185 were by far the most important; the increase of educational
641 opportunities and general culture; and the development of
the economy through agricultural improvement and the ex-
pansion of industry and trade.

- 177 Political freedom in Eastern Europe before the First
642 World War ranged in degree from negligible rights, as those
of the Slovaks in Hungary or of the Poles in Russia, to in-
dependent states with constitutions of strongly democratic
tendencies, as in certain countries of Southeastern Europe.
The latter had been influenced by Western models, and made
provision for parliamentary government based on wide suf-
frage. The constitutions of Serbia, Rumania, and Bulgaria,
drafted in the latter half of the nineteenth century by native
statesmen experienced in the ways of Western constitution-
alism, were founded on a genuine faith in democracy. It is
true that royal or ministerial authoritarianism and resort to
rough methods were not uncommon in these countries, yet
the social egalitarianism already prevailing in Serbia and
Bulgaria was a strong force for democracy in these coun-
tries. Although illiteracy and political inexperience remained
[66] a serious obstacle to orderly government, the generation be-
fore the First World War offers significant examples of gov-
ernments being changed by orderly democratic procedures.
Illustrative of the difficulties under which popular elections
with universal male suffrage were conducted is the fact that
in the Bulgarian election of 1880 only 32 per cent of those
eligible to vote cast their ballots, in contrast to about 80 per
cent in France and Belgium and 60 per cent in Germany and
Italy in the period 1875-80.

177 Hungary had a longer tradition of constitutional govern-
642 ment than did the Balkan states and after 1867 was in most
563 respects an independent state, but its social structure was
more conservative and its desire for political democracy less
evident. Moreover, the Magyar achievement of political
autonomy was marred by the oppressive treatment of the

non-Magyar minorities. Thus in a parliament that as late as 1910 represented scarcely more than one quarter of the adult male population, the Magyars who numbered just over one half the population, apart from Croatia, had 405 seats to 8 for the Slovak and Rumanian minorities. The Croats were represented by 40 deputies when mutual Croatian-Hungarian affairs were under discussion. The Czechs and the Poles in the Austrian provinces developed an aristocratic form of local self-government in the latter half of the nineteenth century and contributed distinguished statesmen to the Austrian government, and at least the Czechs gained experience in the techniques and responsibilities of democracy in local government and in unofficial organizations. Similarly in the Polish-inhabited lands of the German and Russian empires, little opportunity was available for gaining experience in electoral and parliamentary procedures.

Educational opportunities in Eastern Europe were steadily improved in the century after 1815 despite frequently hostile government attitudes. The greatest progress in this field was made in the Czech-inhabited provinces of the Habsburg monarchy, where general compulsory education was introduced in 1869. In Hungary popular education was started somewhat later, and illiteracy among the Magyars declined rapidly. The schools, however, were used as a vehicle for the Magyarization of the non-Magyar minorities of Hungary and, as a consequence, the great majority of Slovak and Rumanian children were compelled to get their education in the Magyar language. In Hungary, discounting Croatia, there were four times as many Magyar-language schools as non-Magyar and five times as many Magyar schoolteachers. The Slovenes under Austrian rule and the autonomous Croats fared a great deal better, while in independent Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Rumania, national school systems were developed insofar as meager resources permitted. The Poles fared differently in their three parts. In

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665 actions a triple objective: to mislead the people, to prevent the postwar restoration of political parties by their original leaders and members or to break them up if they had been restored already, and to beguile foreign opinion into believing that multiparty systems still existed in the Eastern European countries.

The lack of popular support of the Communist parties is visible even today in the countries behind the Iron Curtain. For this reason, in the last elections in Poland and in Rumania in 1952, and in Hungary in 1953, the lists of candidates, made out completely by the Communists, were presented to the people under the disguise of a "National Front." The National Front is represented as a coalition of political parties, trade unions, youth organizations, scientific societies and so forth, and is highlighted by the names of "patriot-priests" and "progressive Catholics." The Communist press in Poland admits that the institution of the National Front was necessary in the elections of 1952 because in 60 per cent of the voting localities, especially in the villages, there were "white spots," that is, areas where there did not exist a single cell of the Communist Party.

665 In summary, it can be said that the Communist dictatorship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
 177 ship was imposed upon the countries behind the Iron Cur-
 642 tain under the name of People's Democracy through the following means: Moscow's strategic and political machinations during the war; the direct intervention of the Red Army and the NKVD in the internal affairs of these countries both at the end of and after the war; either the falsification of the will of these nations in the elections or the *coup d'état*, as in Hungary in 1947, and in Czechoslovakia in 1948.

665 An analysis of Communist strength clearly shows that the Communists could not have expected in a single case to assume power in a democratic and parliamentary manner. And, it must be added, the peoples of the Eastern Euro-

- 665 tanism" of the West was introduced, and the Communists vigorously went about the destruction of the remaining private property, the collectivization of agriculture, and the transformation of the remaining independent cooperatives into a sector of the Communist state economy. It was therefore, in theory and practice a period of the establishment of socialist states, ruled by the dictatorship of the proletariat and disguised by the name of People's Democracy. This period was marked by the accelerated tempo of the communization of all spheres of national life, by the integration of the economies of the People's Democracy into the Soviet economy, and by political and legislative preparations for the incorporation of these countries into the Soviet Union.
- 177 Analysis of the constitutions imposed upon the captive countries shows that the People's Democracies are dictatorships of the proletariat different in form but not in substance from the Soviet system. No matter when the constitutions of the People's Democracies were imposed or whether there were differences in their wording, the most important provisions are the same in each constitution. More light can be cast on these constitutions by the political circumstances in which they were imposed and by their preambles than by a dry analysis of their provisions.
- [643] In Bulgaria in 1946 the Communists falsified the elections, and in 1947 they introduced in the Parliament the draft of a new constitution. According to this draft, the president was still to be the head of the state and not the Chairman of the Presidium of the Parliament as in Soviet Russia. On September 23, 1947, the leader of the opposition, Petkov, was hanged by the Communists, and on December 4, 1947, a revised constitution was imposed upon Bulgaria. This new constitution went further in its provisions than the constitutions imposed several years later in the other captive countries. The office of the president

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was abolished and the office of the President of the National Assembly was established. Article 1 does not speak of a "socialist state governed by the dictatorship of the proletariat" but neither does it mention "People's Democracy." It only proclaims that Bulgaria is a "People's Republic with a representative Government . . . where all power derives from the people and belongs to the people." 177 • 642

The Albanian Constitution of March 15, 1946, also proclaims that "Albania is a People's Republic in which all powers are derived from and belong to the people." It provides also that the "President of the Presidium of the People's Convention is the head of the State." The constitutions of both countries faithfully reflect the Soviet system and, in the event of the incorporation of these countries into the U.S.S.R., no significant constitutional changes would be necessary. [643]

In Hungary on August 31, 1947, after the *coup d'état* of May 1947 against the government of Premier Nagy, new elections were held, and in August 1949 a new constitution was introduced. One section of the preamble to this constitution states the following:

Our people under the leadership of the working class, steeled in the battles during the last decades, enriched by the experience of the revolution of 1919, and relying on the USSR laid the foundation of socialism and our country now is going forward by means of the people's democracy, toward socialism.

Hungary became a People's Republic (Article 1) and was proclaimed "a state of the workers and of the working peasantry" (Article 2). The constitution further stated that "The close union of the workers and working peasantry shall be accomplished in the Hungarian People's Republic under the leadership of the workers" (Article 3), and that "The working people shall gradually oust the capitalist elements and consistently build the socialist economic order" (Ar-

- 642 ticle 4). The Presidium of the People's Republic with its
177 President was established and the post of the President
abolished.

In Czechoslovakia on May 9, 1948, following the *coup d'état* of February 1948, a new constitution was enacted. The preamble reads: "We, the Czechoslovakian People, declare that we are firmly resolved to build up our liberated State as a People's democracy which will ensure to us a peaceful road to socialism." Article 1 states that "The Czechoslovakian State is a People's democratic Republic. The people are the sole source of all power in the State." According to this constitution, the President of the Republic remained the head of the state and Czechoslovakia still differs from the other captive countries in this respect.

In Yugoslavia, Tito introduced at the very beginning the most advanced form of a Soviet-style system; he recently reassumed the title of President of the Republic in place of the title of President of the National Assembly.

In Poland, after the falsification of the elections in 1947, a so-called Little Constitution, based on the Soviet system of councils, was introduced. It established a Council of State whose "chairman" was also the President of the Republic. On July 22, 1952, a new constitution was imposed upon Poland. The preamble to this constitution states:

The Polish People's Republic is a republic of the working people. . . .

As a result of the revolutionary struggles and changes, the power of the capitalists and landlords has been overthrown and the state of People's democracy has been established. The basis of the present people's power constitutes the alliance of the working class with the working peasantry. In this alliance the leading role belongs to the working class, the leading class of the society, basing itself on the revolutionary achievements of the Polish and international working movement, on the historical experiences of the victorious building of socialism in the USSR, the first state of workers and peasants. . . .

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The Polish People's Republic is a state of People's democracy. 642
In the Polish People's Republic power belongs to the working 177
people of town and country. (Article 1)

The office of the President of the Republic was abolished [43]
and the office of the Chairman of the Council of State be-
came the highest post in the state. Poland is no longer the
Republic of Poland. It is now called the Polish People's Re-
public.

In Rumania, the constitution of 1948 was replaced by a
new constitution forced upon Rumania on July 18, 1952.
The preamble to the new constitution declares that "The
Rumanian People's Republic is a state of working people
of town and countryside," and that "The present Constitu-
tion of the Rumanian People's Republic embodies the re-
sults so far obtained by the working people headed by the
working class, in building a socialist society in our country."
The highest organ of state power is the General National
Assembly and its Presidium, while the highest executive and
administrative organ of state power is the Council of Minis-
ters. The organs of state power in regions, districts, towns,
and rural localities are the people's councils of the working
people of town and country.

The examples cited from the texts and preambles of the
constitutions of the captive countries show clearly that, al-
though the Communist dictatorship in the Soviet Union has
achieved the first phase in the development of communism
—"the socialist state based on the dictatorship of the prole-
tariat"—and is now on the way to the higher phase, the
People's Democracies, according to communist theory, are
still on the road to the first phase. This theoretical distinction
made by the Communists has no great importance in prac-
tice particularly inasmuch as constitutional changes in all
these People's Republics have made complete political and
legal preparations for incorporation into the U.S.S.R.

As far as Yugoslavia is concerned, in the period of friendly

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- 642 Stalin-Tito relations her communist system was much further advanced than that of any other Iron Curtain country, and since the break with Stalin only insignificant changes have been made in the structure of the highest organs of government. Tito still declares clearly and without any reservation that he intends to maintain the communist system in that country at any price.

IV

- 208 When communist propaganda speaks of the liberation of the oppressed masses from the slavery of the privileged and the rich, it stresses the term, People's Democracy. But does this term really signify freedom? Does it respect human dignity? Does it recognize equality among the people? Does it abolish undue privileges and the exploitation of the working people? It does not. In practice, it does not even provide personal freedom or personal security.

- 697 The overcrowded prisons and the many thousands of people in the forced labor camps bear witness to this. The Soviet Union and all the countries occupied by it are a large prison from which the majority of the people would escape if they only could. They would flee from the "Communist paradise" partly because of the difficult economic conditions, but mostly because of the unbearable atmosphere created by the insecurity and complete lack of freedom which are part of this system.

The majority of the people escaping today are average people—workers, peasants, craftsmen, small merchants, and others who have never belonged to any privileged or exploiting class. I have read a number of books on the living conditions in the Soviet forced labor camps; I have studied thousands of reports of Poles who have passed through Soviet camps and prisons; I have had hundreds of talks with the victims of the Soviet regime. And I have come

relative lack in fundamental economic innovation and social learning in that geographic area, if we take the extent of such learning and innovation in the Western countries as our standard. /82

On this view, the Western way of life—thus far the way of life of a minority of mankind—has been built upon a certain fundamental willingness to learn, and a basic acceptance of both some mobility, at least in society, and of some innovations in accustomed practices and habits. Against the background of this Western culture, large-scale markets and economic competition, as well as the impact of the modern centralized state, had a chance of functioning as accelerators of technological and social change: they tended to lure or push people away from social roles or economic occupations which were poorly rewarded and into new roles or occupations where the gains were greater. Western economic and political institutions succeeded the better in this function of accelerating social change where they impinged upon individuals who had the economic and social resources for moving, and at least a minimum of cultural and psychological willingness to do so. Where these economic and cultural preconditions did not exist, however, or where they existed only in part, the effect of the impact of Western institutions was bound to be quite different, and these differences became dramatically visible in the area of Eastern Europe. 000

III

Eastern Europe, seen from this aspect, was a semi-Western area. It was fully exposed to Western practices and institutions both in the field of higher education, particularly university education, and in the fields of military drill and warfare, and particularly in the use of conscripted armies, although it could operate in this field only as long as no extensive industrial facilities for the use of massed artillery 177 ●

- 177 were needed. Large parts of the area were exposed to Western methods of tax collecting, accounting, and fiscal policy, as well as public administration. They were exposed to the activities of modern bankers, and to a considerable extent to the practices of modern commerce, newspapers, and advertising. They were also exposed in large part to compulsory elementary public education.

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571 As a result of these exposures in the nineteenth century, the peoples of Eastern Europe learned to accept completely the prevailing Western standards of theoretical science, as well as of intellectual and artistic life. They accepted to a considerable extent Western ideals of living standards, standards of consumption, wage levels, working conditions, and social welfare. Finally, many of them came to expect Western standards of farm prosperity, rural welfare, and peasant independence and cooperation. In sum, a large part of the populations of Eastern Europe accepted Western living standards as their goal, or at least as a pattern of their claims and expectations.

433 This rapid diffusion of Western-style claims and expectations was not matched by any comparable diffusion of Western-style work habits, savings and investment patterns, levels of productivity, or propensities to technological innovations. Land reforms in Eastern Europe were not only slow in coming, but they did little to increase productivity. The consolidation of separate strips of land, long accomplished in Scandinavia and Western Europe, was still not completed in Eastern Europe by the time of the Second World War. The tools and implements of artisans and peasants changed their traditional shape much more slowly in Eastern Europe than they did in Germany or England and pathetically more slowly than they did in the United States. Throughout most of the regions organized labor feared that increases in productivity would only lead to losses of employment. Employers and businessmen aspired to use the profits

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main body of interallied agreements—particularly those of Moscow, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam, along with the armistice agreements and the subsequent peace treaties—as their authority to impress the Soviet system of controls over the territories newly taken from the Germans. 727

By the end of 1945, the Soviet Union was in a position to control the political destinies of Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria under the sanctions provided by the armistice terms. However, the process of coordination into the Soviet sphere was anything but smooth and gave little evidence of the much-vaunted Russian planning. Although Rumania was under the Russian thumb within twelve days after the signing of the Yalta agreement, that unhappy country remained a monarchy until December 1947. Czechoslovakia did not fall completely into the Soviet net until 1948, while Hungary fought a losing battle until 1947. Controlled elections elsewhere facilitated the extension of Communist power, so that between the period 1945 and the end of the year 1947 the process of political assimilation was completed. Local Communist parties were installed in all countries—save Yugoslavia where political control had been in the hands of the Communist Party since 1944—by the grace of the Soviet power. In this period the Soviet pattern of inculcating obedience through terror was rapidly imposed. 177 64 642 S.U.

From the Soviet point of view this revolution was but an action on the part of sovereign states, rather than of satellite states as that term is used in the West. Not only were the states of Eastern Europe sovereign, according to Communist doctrine, but the Communist parties that controlled the political life of their respective countries held that their major function was to protect the national independence of their states against the imperialism of the West. This theory had expression in the basic document of the Communist Information Bureau—the resolution on world affairs which appeared on October 5, 1947. 648

dialectic which would reflect the changes in his country's ⁶⁴⁸ international position.

First, the policies of the Soviet Union and the ideas of Stalin himself were attacked as marked departures from the true path of Socialism. Second, in contradistinction to the ⁶⁴² policies of "bureaucratic state capitalism" evolved by the ⁶⁴⁶ Kremlin and followed in slavish pattern by the satellites, Yugoslavia decentralized its machinery of economic planning, gave greater power to workers' councils, reorganized local government, and re-wrote the national constitution. An interesting feature of the recently amended constitution is the provision for a Council of Producers, as one of the two parliamentary bodies. In this council industrial workers are disproportionately represented by 135 deputies, while only 67 represent agriculture. Under this arrangement, the agricultural population has one representative for every 150,825 peasants, while the urban is represented by one deputy for every 30,239 workers.

In its organization, the Council of Producers is strikingly ¹⁷⁷ similar to another proposal advanced by another state that ⁶⁴ adopted the philosophy of integral nationalism, Mussolini's ⁶⁴² Corporative Italy. According to the latter, the corporations were instruments responsible for "the regulation of the productive forces, with a view to the development of the wealth, the political power and the well-being of the Italian people." This statement of purpose does not differ greatly from the ideology advanced by Kardelj on behalf of the new constitution.

In any event, the character of the power structure—that is, ⁶⁴² the structure of social power focused on the state—has not changed. Decentralized though the power may be, the Communist party still controls the councils where important decisions are made. Effective opposition to the regime is still unknown. Democrats who have opposed Tito and his policies still remain imprisoned and, while important concessions

● 177 By 1949, Soviet-style dictatorships had been established in
 64 seven of these thirteen sovereign states. In these "Iron Cur-
 642 tain" states, dictatorship was and is exercised through a native
 631 minority who could not have won power without the support
 of the Soviet Union and the Soviet armies, and who—with
 the conspicuous exception of Yugoslavia—could not retain
 this power if Soviet support were withdrawn. The indirect
 rule thus exercised by the Soviet dictatorship, with the help
 of native personnel, over six of the Eastern European states
 —Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria,
 and Albania—might remind the observer at first glance of the
 indirect rule exercised in past centuries by the empires of
 Turkey and Russia over some of the principalities then exist-
 ing in the region. Upon this superficial view, it might seem
 that despite all the violent changes in political sovereignty
 and national allegiance during the last one hundred years,
 the fundamental dependence of the peoples of this region
 upon foreign powers had remained essentially unchanged.

175 This impression would be quite deceptive. In 1853, the
 government of Eastern Europe by only six powers had en-
 dured for more than two hundred years, with Sweden and
 Poland rather than Greece and Montenegro playing the rôles
 of the fifth and sixth power at the side of Prussia, Russia,
 Austria, and Turkey. With the single exception of Poland,
 which by the end of the eighteenth century had become the
 victim of her neighbors, the administrative services of these
 powers were generally based upon foreign personnel drawn
 from peoples outside the region. Austria and Prussia de-
 pended upon the military and administrative services of Ger-
 mans, Russia upon those of Great Russians, and Turkey in
 the last analysis had to rely upon the support of the Ottoman
 Turks. Natives of the different regions supplemented the
 personnel of these administrative services but did not domi-
 nate it. The rule of these foreign or semiforeign empires over
 the peoples of Eastern Europe was based upon this region's

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chosen by lot. Then at the appointed hour in the night they pounce on their victim and hack him to pieces in a bestial fashion.

Such is the situation in Russia. There are also concentration camps in the satellite countries, called in Communist language "People's Democracies." It has been estimated that more than 1,000,000 persons have been sent to such camps, and the number may be far greater. Not included in this figure, for example, are Eastern Germany and the former Baltic States. The existence of concentration camps has been widely advertised, and decrees establishing them are on the statute books of all the People's Democracies. The decrees merely apply to the country in question the provisions of Article 59 of the Criminal Code of U.S.S.R. The first Article of the Criminal Code of Rumania, for example, as reported by Albert K. Herling, reads as follows:

Criminal law has for its purpose defending the Rumanian People's Republic and its legal order against actions dangerous to society by enforcing legal measures of social defense against persons who commit such actions. In the meaning of the preceding paragraph any action and omission that brings harm to the economic, social and political structure, or to the security of the Rumanian People's Republic, or which disturbs the legal order established by the people under the leadership of the working class is to be considered dangerous to society. The actions which are considered dangerous for society can be punished even when they are not expressly prohibited by law. In such cases the extent and limit of criminal responsibility is to be determined in accordance with the legal provisions in force for similar crimes.*

The number of camps in the area reported by persons who assert that they were present in them is so vast that the names by

* Statement issued on June 18, 1952, in behalf of the International League for the Rights of Man.

642 have been made to the peasants, state cooperatives are still maintained in the heavy grain producing areas by forces other than the peasants' love of the soil and its products.

If the Yugoslav government will learn the meaning of Lord Acton's axiom on the nature of power, and if the West pursues an intelligent, long-range foreign policy supporting Yugoslavia against Soviet aggression, it may be possible to revive in Yugoslavia and hence in the Balkans as a whole the elements of an independent political life.

V

000 The months following the death of Premier Stalin in March 1953, saw a number of internal changes in the various people's democracies. The principal means of coercion and political control nevertheless remained unchanged: the army and the police forces. These were still bound tightly to Russian controls.

● 177, The total number of men in the satellite armies available
70 for service with the Soviet army has been estimated at a mil-
701 lion and one-half. Since they are not only trained under Soviet
625 commanders, but operate under the Soviet military code, it is possible to state that the Sovietization of the satellite armies has been completed. Together with the armies, the satellite police form the backbone of the Soviet instruments of coercion. Estimated at a total of 700,000 men, police units organized in military formations range in function from the well-known secret police to People's Militia, Frontier Guards, and Railway Guards. Like the satellite armies, the satellite police are governed by Soviet regulations. Together they enforce a system of order which has been designed to conform with the Soviet model.

241 In common with Yugoslavia, certain states in the orbit are
656 strengthening the weakest sector of the economy: agriculture. It is not certain that the Yugoslav experience compelled the

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visions were included in the peace treaties with Hungary and Bulgaria, and the states that had been created or enlarged as a result of the war assumed similar obligations. The provisions for the protection of minorities were concerned with the use of language in schools and courts, the practice of religion, and the equitable administration of social security. Their implementation by the respective governments was supervised by a Minorities Commission in the League of Nations, and a system of petitions was established for bringing injustices to the attention of the League. Although the principles underlying this system represented a great advance over pre-war practice, the efforts at implementation failed to meet the needs of the situation. In many cases the minorities continued to be discriminated against, and even when they were not, nationalist movements sponsored by neighboring countries often proved irresistible. As a result, the problem of minorities became one of the fundamental sources of political instability in Eastern Europe. 563
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Another unfavorable factor was that richer families sent their children to foreign universities, especially to France, Germany, and Great Britain, while there was little student exchange among the Eastern European countries themselves. Educated people knew a great deal about Western Europe, but much less about neighboring states and peoples. Naturally, this was even more so among nations which had been enemies in the First World War and which now fiercely condemned their citizens if they praised the culture or progress of a former enemy. However, this situation was not unique to this region. It was characteristic of Europe as a whole and, like the development of nationalism and industry, moved from West to East. 177●
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Many of Eastern Europe's difficulties stemmed from the instability of its political life. Governments changed constantly and political parties fought each other to the last breath. Due to the many changes of government, an unwhole- 642
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